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This paper constitutes the first attempt to bridge the evolutionary theory in economics
and the theory of active particles in mathematics. It seeks to present a kinetic model
for an evolutionary formalization of economic dynamics. The new derived mathematical
representation intends to formalize the processes of learning and selection as the two
fundamental drivers of evolutionary environments [G. Dosi, M.-C. Pereira and M.-E.
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2 N. Bellomo et al.
statistical properties of industrial dynamics, Ind. Corp. Change, 26 (2017) 187–210]. To
coherently represent the aforementioned properties, the kinetic theory of active particles
[N. Bellomo, A. Bellouquid, L. Gibelli and N. Outada, A Quest Towards a Mathemat-
ical Theory of Living Systems (Birkhäuser-Springer, 2017)] is here further developed,
including the complex interaction of two hierarchical functional subsystems. Modeling
and simulations enlighten the predictive ability of the approach. Finally, we outline the
potential avenues for future research.
Keywords: Evolutionary dynamics; idiosyncratic learning; market selection; active
particles; kinetic theory.
AMS Subject Classification: 82D99, 91D10
1. Introduction
This paper constitutes the first attempt to bridge the evolutionary theory in eco-
nomics and the theory of active particles in mathematics. It seeks to present a
kinetic model for an evolutionary formalization of economic dynamics. The new
derived mathematical representation intends to formalize the processes of learn-
ing and selection as the two fundamental drivers of evolutionary environments.12
Within the framework of an evolutionary interpretation of industrial dynamics, the
interplay between these two engines shapes the dynamics of market shares and
collectively the patterns of change of industry-level variables such as average pro-
ductivity. The learning process derives from the accumulation of knowledge which
evolves together with the patterns of innovation and imitation, the changes in tech-
niques of production, and in general the arrival of new technological paradigms. The
accumulated capabilities become the marker of each individual firm. The selection
process is the outcome of market interaction, whereby more competitive firms gain
market shares at the expense of less competitive ones.
In economics, a promising account of such dynamics is by means of Agent-Based
Models (ABMs), a family of formalizations typically explored via computer simula-
tions, studying the emergence of aggregate statistical regularities in the evolutionary
process stemming from the interaction among a multitude of agents, characterized
by a quite rich phenomenological structure in terms of what they do and how they
interact. Take as an example the model in Refs. 12 and 13 which compares different
learning regimes in their impact on the overall functioning of industries. That paper
attempts at understanding the interplay between cumulative learning and selection
processes to account for the statistical regularities characterizing firms and industry
evolution, e.g. persistent productivity differentials, tent-shaped growth rates, per-
sistent entry-exit, scaling law of the variance of growth versus size relationship. We
do find that the coupling of learning and selection is an extremely powerful genera-
tive mechanism of the stylized facts above. We address also the equivalence between
Polya Urns and replicator dynamics representations of the selection process.
This paper explores an alternative route and provides a first systematic bridge
between the evolutionary approach in economics and the kinetic theory of active
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From particles to firms 3
by means of behavioral rules, the kinetic theory of active particles specifies the
probability distributions which govern the form and the intensity of the interaction
process and, as such, the overall drivers of the dynamics.
Drawing upon Ref. 1 this paper substantially extends the modeling approach.
First by using a complete discrete time framework to better adhere to the descrip-
tion of economic processes, second by introducing a hierarchy in the topology of the
interactions with two functional subsystems (FSs), a first one independently evolv-
ing and a second one endogenous to the interaction among entities. In so doing, we
mean to couple the overall hill climbing process driven by innovation and knowl-
edge accumulation with the interactive competitive dynamics among heterogeneous
entities. As in Ref. 12, we study the interplay between alternative learning regimes
in terms of degrees of cumulativeness and the ensuing selection outcomes.
Our paper goes beyond the modeling approach based on established mathemat-
ical tools. Indeed, new mathematical tools have been developed on the ground of
the evolutionary theory of economic change, thus enriching its interpretative power.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Sec. 2 briefly discusses learn-
ing and selection in economic systems deepening the dialogue between economics
and mathematics. Section 3 first presents a generalized structure of kinetic theory
for two FSs regulated by a hierarchical relationship, and second specifies the inter-
action mechanisms underlying the processes of learning and selection. Section 4
develops a battery of simulation exercises matching the model outputs with styl-
ized facts on industrial structures and dynamics. Section 5 concludes by discussing
further avenues of research focusing on the quest of a theory of complex evolving
systems in social sciences.3,4,6,20,27
2. Learning and Selection in the Evolutionary Theory
of Economic Change
Evolutionary theories of economic change identify the processes of idiosyncratic
learning by individual firms and of market selection as the two main drivers of
the dynamics of industries. The interplay between these two engines shapes the
dynamics of market shares and entry-exit and, collectively, of productivities and
size distributions. Firm-specific learning (what in the empirical literature is some-
times broadly called the within effect) stands for various processes of idiosyncratic
innovation, imitation, and changes in techniques of production. Selection (what
is usually denominated the between effect) is the outcome of processes of market
interaction where more “competitive” firms — on whatever criteria — gain market
shares at the expense of less competitive ones, some firms die, and others enter.
One of the basic intuition in our whole interpretation is that both learning and
competition entail correlation mechanisms which yield as such systematic depar-
tures from Gaussian stochastic processes.
In modern capitalism, business firms are a central locus of the efforts to advance
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the knowledge and the procedures underlying each technology are to a good extent
embodied in organizational routines and other “quasi genetic action patterns” of
organizations. Indeed, an emerging capability-based theory of the firm places the
“primitives” of the nature of business firms in their problem-solving features, that
is their abilities to address practical and cognitive problems, ranging from, say, the
production of a car to the identification of a malaria-curing molecule.
The approach — fully acknowledging ubiquitous forms of human bounded ratio-
nality, grossly imperfect processes of learning and diverse social distributions of
cognitive labor — attempts to identify the distinctive capabilities of organizations as
emergent from their distinctive ensembles of organizational routines. And, dynami-
cally, the approach tries to account for the processes by which organizational knowl-
edge is acquired, maintained, augmented and sometimes lost. Learning regimes
might be independent from the relative position of the firms in the landscape, imply-
ing that good and bad firms are exposed in probability to the acquisition of similar
degrees of knowledge. Alternatively, learning regimes might be proportional to the
position of the firm in the landscape, wherein better performing firms acquire more
knowledge than the rest.
Idiosyncratic capabilities and, dynamically, idiosyncratic patterns of learning
by firms are the general rule. In turn, such persistently heterogeneous firms are
nested in competitive environments, which shape their individual economic fate
and, collectively, the evolution of the forms of industrial organization. Differences
in products and in processes of production — and as a consequence costs and
prices — are central features of the competitive process in which firms are involved
in different ways. Let us call Schumpeterian competition the process through which
heterogeneous firms compete on the basis of the products and services they offer
and obviously their prices, and get selected — with some firms growing, some
declining, some going out of business, some new ones always entering. Such processes
of competition and selection are continuously fueled by the activities of innovation,
adaptation, imitation by incumbent firms and by entrants.
In turn, the processes of industrial evolution leave statistical footprints in terms
of industrial structures and firm dynamics. So, for example, different learning
regimes impact on the selection process, resulting in more or less concentrated mar-
kets. Thanks to massive infusions of micro-data over the last 20 years, one has
begun to identify a few robust statistical properties characterizing industrial struc-
tures, their changes, and performance indicators. In particular, such stylized facts
include persistent heterogeneity in productivity and skewed size distributions.
In the following, we shall present a model which begins to address those pat-
terns, under minimal phenomenological specifications of behaviors and interactions.
Knowledge is represented as an independent evolving field which differently hits
each firm. It is a metaphor of a growing pool of innovative opportunities to which
all firms might have access. The learning dynamics is idiosyncratic and each firm
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From particles to firms 5
replicator dynamics which favors the most innovative firms and selects out the least
innovative ones.
3. Modeling by Means of the Kinetic Theory of Active Particles
The kinetic theory of active particles5 represents a new and powerful avenue to
formalize the evolutionary traits of industrial dynamics. This approach shares with
the classical kinetic theory10 the representation of a large system of interacting
entities by a probability distribution function over their individual states, e.g. at
the microscopic scale. The dynamics is obtained by equating the time derivative of
the probability distribution to the difference between the inlet and the outlet flows
in the elementary volume of the space of the microscopic states.
This theory has been introduced in Ref. 1 to model the dynamics of socio-
economic systems constituted by a large number of interacting entities, called
kinetic theory of active particles, in short a-particles. An overview of the appli-
cations and covered domains in which the kinetic theory of a-particles has been
employed is presented in Ref. 2, see also Ref. 11. Applications on biological systems,
crowd dynamics, and social systems are presented and discussed in Ref. 5 showing
how a mathematical description of living entities can be achieved.
Unlike the kinetic theory of classical particles, the microscopic state is not only
identified by the position and velocity of the particles, but it also includes a vector
of additional variables, called activities, which models the forms of interactions. The
whole system can be subdivided into groups of interest called FSs. Additionally,
interactions, which in the kinetic theory10 are governed by basic principles of classi-
cal mechanics, in the a-particles approach are modeled by stochastic links, wherein
actors/agents are identified by probability distributions. In so doing, interactions
do not simply involve individual entities but also collections of them.
Irreversibility of the interaction processes and potential state-dependent param-
eters fuel the nonlinear nature of the approach, increasing the level of complexity
and calling for a computational analysis. Indeed, diverse types of behaviors of agents
and more generally system complexity4 might be appropriately modeled. Theoreti-
cal tools of evolutionary games16,21–23,26 are simple domains of application, but, as
we shall see here, the applicability goes well beyond.
In the following, inspired by Ref. 2, our mathematical derivation will avoid
mean-field approximations to let extreme behaviors to emerge. Complementary
but different approaches closer to a kinetic theory allowing for Boltzmann and
Fokker–Plank equations are in Refs. 15, 17 and 24, while mathematical tools of
statistical-stochastic dynamics and game theory are in Refs. 18 and 25.
The sequential steps of the derivation of the model include:
(1) Representation of the FSs involved in the dynamics, where FSs are constituted
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(2) Derivation of a mathematical structure suitable to describe the dynamics of the
dependent variables derived in the first step.
(3) Specification of individual interactions by inserting them into the general math-
ematical structure derived in the second step.
3.1. Functional subsystems
In order to characterize the dynamics of learning and selection we introduce two
FSs which are nested into a hierarchical structure:
• Subsystem 1. Evolutionary landscape
It represents the dynamics of learning to which firms are subject to. It is meant
to capture the arrival of new technologies, new ideas, new organizational prac-
tices. It evolves independently from firm interactions, and it follows a continuous
growth process. In economic terms, it represents the evolution of the technological
frontier.
• Subsystem 2. Endogenous system of interactions
It comprises two distinct levels of interactions: one which determines the advance-
ment of knowledge of each individual firm through the action of the first sub-
system, the second which entails the competition in the market arena among
heterogeneous firms in terms of knowledge level.
Formally, we suppose that the system of firms expresses two components of the
activity, namely w ∈ [0,∞) and v ∈ [0, 1], which correspond, respectively, to the
level of knowledge and to the market shares, where v is divided by the overall size
of the market. The overall system of endogenous interactions moves according to
the shape of the landscape ϕ(ξ), where ξ ∈ Dξ is the activity variable modeling the
learning action. This support constantly increases the domain of w and modifies
the probability distribution over this variable so that a scaling of w implies an
analogous scaling of ξ. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the growth process of the support
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From particles to firms 7
is not a translation (constant shift) but is instead a nonlinear process acting in
probability, meaning that, according to the specification, it might differently hit
firms occupying different knowledge positions.
Let us now provide additional details on the scaling problem. Supposing that
at time t = 0, the domain of w is bounded by the minimal and maximal values
wm(t = 0) and wM (t = 0), respectively, a scaled variable can be introduced:
u =
w − wm(t = 0)
wM (t = 0)− wm(t = 0) ⇒ Du(t = 0) = [0, 1]. (3.1)
We define the dynamics of the evolutionary landscape as the variation over time of
the domains of the activity variables u and ξ which move from the initial state to
higher values.
In order to position each firm, a discrete equally spaced distribution is used for
all variables:
Cu = {u1, . . . , un, . . . , um}, h = 1
m− 1
, m > n, (3.2)
where the initial conditions for the level of knowledge, learning action, and market
share are referred to the collocation {u1, . . . , un}. Nodes for i > n mark the evolu-
tion of the system, while um represents a limit value of the knowledge which can
be reached during each time interval.
We can now proceed to define the variables describing the state of the system
as follows:
• f = {fi(t) = f(t;ui)} represents the fraction of firms, called i-firms, for each
i-level, where i > n ⇒ fi(t = 0) = 0. The evolution dynamics is such that, for
t > 0, fi can reach positive values for i > 0.
• ϕ = γ0{ϕi} defines the set of the learning actions over the i-firms, where γ0 is
a positive defined constant modeling the rate of the action and ϕi defines the
learning action for each i-knowledge level.
• v = {vi(t)} defines the set of market shares of each i-firm.






ϕν(t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0. (3.3)
3.2. Interaction dynamics, learning and selection
Let us now detail the relevant interactions to define the dynamics of the system:
(1) The model entails a hierarchical structure: the idiosyncratic learning process,
i.e. the dynamics of f , governed by the interaction between the first and the sec-
ond FSs over the variable u, is not influenced by the market shares, namely by
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(2) The hierarchical structure entails that both the shape of the probability distri-
bution over u and the collocation Cu evolve over time, while the collocation of
the learning action follows the evolution of Cu.
Learning
Let us consider the derivation of a general mathematical structure suitable to
describe the dynamics of the probability distribution f based on the selection of non
trivial interactions. According to the kinetic theory of active particles, the number
of firms f = {fi(t) = f(t;ui)} in the elementary volume of the space of microscopic
states should remain unaltered, when subject to firm activities. In fact, given the
interactive structure, firms might move from one state to another. Some firms might
enter new states by advancing or regressing along the collocation. These movements
define inflow and outflow of firms for each position. Interactions are supposed to be
stochastic, according to the following hypotheses:
• η0 denotes the rate of interactions between firms and learning actions, supposed
to be constant.
• The dynamics is sensitive only to the action at the same level in the collocation
and Ah(h → i) is the probability that an h-firm shifts in the knowledge level
from h to i, independently from the level of market shares, due to the interaction
with an h-action (see Fig. 2).




Ah(h → i) = 1, for all inputs. (3.4)
Fig. 2. The learning process derived from the interaction with the landscape. The squares rep-
resent the technological opportunities hitting each firm (circle). The vertical arrows represent the
learning actions over the landscape ϕ = γ0(ϕi), while the horizontal arrows represent the shift of
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From particles to firms 9
The inflow into the elementary volume of the space of the activity variables
corresponds to the number (rate) of firms adopting the ith microscopic state, while
the outflow corresponds to the number of firms losing such state. Therefore, the














Ah(h → i)fhϕh − fi
)
, (3.5)
where μ0 = η0 γ0 and where the notation ∂t is used to distinguish the time derivative
of a probability distribution with respect to the time derivative of a deterministic
variable.
This general transition probability can be specified according to the learning
regime one wants to depict. In the following, we shall look at two alternative learning
regimes.
• Independent learning: The learning action acts on the knowledge level by shifting
firms to the next high level i.e. A(i−1)((i − 1) → i), or Ai(i → (i + 1)), by a
transition probability independent from the collocation i. This assumption yields:
Ai(i → (i+ 1)) = α, and Ai(i → i) = 1− α. (3.6)
By substituting into the mathematical structure (3.5), we get
∂tfi = μ0Γ1i(f , ϕ) = μ0αfi−1ϕi−1 − μ0αfiϕi, (3.7)
where absence of learning actions, namely ∂tfi = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n implies
also ∂tϕi = 0 for all levels of knowledge. The evolution of the learning action
reads:
∂tϕi = γ0Γ1i(f , ϕ) = γ0αfi−1ϕi−1 − γ0αfiϕi. (3.8)
• Cumulative learning: The learning action acts on the knowledge level by shifting
firms to the next high level i.e. A(i−1)((i − 1) → i), or Ai(i → (i + 1)), by a
transition probability which increases with the collocation i.
This assumption yields:
Ai(i → (i+ 1)) = α i
n+ i
and Ai(i → i) = 1− α i
n+ i
. (3.9)
Substitution into the mathematical structure (3.5) yields:
∂tfi = μ0Γ1i(f , ϕ) = μ0α
i
n+ i
fi−1ϕi−1 − μ0α i
n+ i
fiϕi, (3.10)
while the evolution of the learning action reads:
∂tϕi = γ0Γ1i(f , ϕ) = γ0α
i
n+ i
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Selection
Let us now present the selection process according to which firms with higher values
of knowledge increase their market shares at the expense of less-knowledgeable
firms. The interaction can be specified according to the following assumptions:
• i-firms gain market shares whenever they interact with h-firms, being uh < ui,
while they lose market shares whenever they interact with h-firms, being uh > ui.
Gains cannot exceed the level v = 1, while losses cannot go below v = 0.
• The frequency and the intensity of interactions are determined by an exogenous,
positively defined parameter β.
• The gain dynamics depends on β, on the distance ui−uh, on the available market
shares vh of the losers, and on the number fi of the gainers in each fitness class.
• The loss dynamics depends on β, on the distance uh−ui, on the available market
shares vi of the losers, and on the number fh of the gainers in each fitness class.
• We introduce the formulation Hij = H(ui − uj), where H is the Heaviside func-
tion, a dichotomous function which maps non-negative values into 1 (H(x) = 1
if x ≥ 0) and negative values into 0 (H(x) = 0 if x < 0).
The assumptions above, while resembling a replicator dynamics, modulate the
selection pressure in the model because of the presence of a reinforcing effect related
to the number of firms in each fitness class. A synthetic representation is provided
in Fig. 3.
We then specify the following m-dimensional differential system, presenting rel-
ative gains and losses, being both terms normalized, where ∂t stands as above for
the time derivative of stochastic variables:
∂tvi = β(1 − vi)
∑m
h=1 Hih · fi · (ui − uh) · vh∑m
k=1(1 − vk)
∑m
h=1 Hkh · fk · (uk − uh) · vh
− βvi
∑m
h=1 Hhi · fh · (uh − ui) · vi∑m
k=1 vk
∑m
h=1Hhk · fh · (uh − uk) · vk
. (3.12)
3.3. The model
The resulting model is obtained by taking the system of the three differential equa-
tions. Dividing all equations by μ0, which can be inserted into the time scale, we
get ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂tfi = fi−1ϕi−1 − fiϕi,
∂tϕi = ε1
1




∂tvi = ε2(1− vi)
∑m
h=1 Hih · fi · (ui − uh) · vh∑m
k=1(1− vk)
∑m
h=1 Hkh · fk · (uk − uh) · vh
− ε2vi
∑m
h=1 Hhi · fh · (uh − ui) · vi∑m
k=1 vk
∑m
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Fig. 3. The competition process. The index j stands for the fitness class. The index i characterizes
the position of each firm in the corresponding fitness class. The index k stands for the learning
actions.








The structural dimension of this system is 3 ·m, it should be solved for initial
conditions for all components fi0 = fi(t = 0), ϕi0 = ϕi(t = 0), vi0 = vi(t = 0),
given for i = 1, . . . , n. Consistency with the model requires that for i > 0, fi0 =
ϕi0 = vi0 = 0.
The hierarchical structure of the model entails the possibility to consider a
special case of absence of learning action. It corresponds to the case ϕ = 0, whereby
only the dynamics of selection and variation of market shares occur, given the initial
knowledge levels.
4. Simulations
In the following, we present a battery of simulation exercises discussing the model
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according to different learning regimes. All simulations are developed for the same
initial conditions, namely
(1) We consider n = 10 FSs corresponding to i-firms, each of them characterized
by the knowledge level ui, with u1 < u2 < · · · < un, where fi(0) = fi0 is the
probability that a firm belongs to the ith FS at the initial time t = 0. Each
fi can be interpreted as the (normalized) number of firms belonging to the ith
FS with i = 1, . . . , n = 10. The initial common market share of each ith FS is
denoted by vi0.
(2) Simulations have been undertaken using the parameter values
η0 = μ0 = γ0 = 1, α = β = 0.1, γ0 = 0.5.
We deem t = 1200 a reasonable time window to allow the model to stabilize.
(3) In terms of initial conditions, knowledge and market share distributions are
supposed to linearly decay as the level of relative knowledge increases. These
initial conditions are shown in Fig. 4.
Three alternative learning regimes are presented in the next subsections focusing
on the following dynamics:
Case 1. Absence of learning;
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Case 2. Independent learning;
Case 3. Cumulative learning.
In Case 1 (absence of learning) the dynamics occurs on the initial 10 knowledge
levels, implying a fixed landscape. However, in Cases 2 and 3 the landscape will
move from the initial 10 positions toward an increasing number of knowledge levels.
The chosen number of evolving subsystems allows to characterize the distribution
asymptotically.
4.1. CASE 1. Absence of learning
We start by considering the extreme case wherein the learning process is shut-down.
In this case, since no idiosyncratic learning occurs, firms do not improve or worsen
their knowledge level, therefore the number of firms in each FS does not change
over time and the landscape is fixed.
The market share in each FS is modified by the interaction between high-
knowledge firms, which accrue market shares, and low-knowledge firms which
lose shares. Figure 5 shows the tendency toward a monopolistic market structure
whereby high-knowledge firms end up taking the whole market.
(a) t = 1 (b) t = 1
(c) t = 5 (d) t = 10
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The robustness of our results are confirmed for a broad range of parameter
values. The latter only affect the speed of the transition dynamics in the rate of
convergence toward a monopoly. The rate of convergence gets slower the higher the
initial number of high-knowledge firms.
The monopoly tendency indeed confirms the correct model specification: as
predicted by the Fisher–Price theorem, any replicator dynamics yields the sole
survival of the fittest. And the rate of growth of average fitness in the transient
depends on its variance across micro-entities.
4.2. CASE 2. Independent learning
Let us now consider the case in which the learning process affects the individual
knowledge of each firm. We suppose the learning dynamics to act independently
from the position of each individual firm, according to a fix transition probability
defined α (see Eq. (3.6)). The resulting learning process entails now a completely
different dynamics of the distribution in the knowledge space.
As shown in Fig. 6 as time goes by, the knowledge distribution changes shape,
while the underlying landscape evolves. In fact, we start by considering m = 20
levels of learning ui, with u1 < u2 < · · · < um.
(a) t = 300 (b) t = 600
(c) t = 900 (d) t = 1200
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(a) t = 300 (b) t = 600
(c) t = 900 (d) t = 1200
Fig. 7. CASE 2 — Market shares over time — Evolving landscape.
Initially only the first n = m/2 knowledge levels are occupied. Due to the
changing landscape, firms gradually move towards higher levels spanning the whole
knowledge range of 20 levels.
Figure 6 clearly shows that not all firms learn at the same rate. Interestingly,
the shape resembles a long left-tail distribution, with knowledge concentrating in
the second half of the landscape. The distribution of u is in line with the persistent
heterogeneity in productivity observed in reality, which tends to increase as long as
the landscape evolves.
How does the “size distribution” evolve? It does so by following the learning
dynamics. In fact, differently from the monopolistic tendency of Case 1, now market
shares in Fig. 7 present a left-skewed distribution, with the highest market share
at fifty percent. Indeed, the evolution of the landscape is reflected in the selection
dynamics severely acting against low-knowledge firms, which tend to be selected
out by the competition process. Market concentration is reflected into a relatively
skewed distribution.
4.3. CASE 3. Cumulative learning
The third case that we consider entails processes of cumulative learning. This learn-
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that who knows more will get in probability more knowledge, while those who know
less will get less knowledge. This case is strongly in line with the learning regimes
occurring in the information economies, wherein economies of scale and near-zero
marginal costs allow an almost “infinite” knowledge growth (more in Ref. 14).
As in the previous case, we start by considering m = 20 FSs of firms, each of
them characterized by knowledge level ui, with u1 < u2 < · · · < um. Initially only
the first n = m/2 knowledge levels are occupied. Once the landscape evolves over
time firms move from the bottom to the upper part of the support.
Figure 8 shows the knowledge distribution. This case represents a sort of leader-
laggard dynamics in which only few high-level knowledge firms are able to reach
the highest positions, while the remaining part of marginal firms stacks in lower
ones. This results into a bimodal knowledge distribution.
In terms of selection, Fig. 9 describes a strongly concentrated market wherein
only two firms own almost the eighty and the twenty percent of the overall market,
respectively. The rest of the firms get out of the market, with almost zero shares.
Forms of tight oligopoly are typical of industries with high front up costs and
low marginal ones, cumulative learning (e.g. the ICT industry), protections by
strong forms of knowledge appropriation as intellectual property rights (e.g. the
pharmaceutical industry).
(a) t = 300 (b) t = 600
(c) t = 900 (d) t = 1200
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k (a) t = 300 (b) t = 600
(c) t = 900 (d) t = 1200
Fig. 9. CASE 3 — Market shares over time — Evolving landscape.
4.4. On the role of mathematical models
Our battery of simulation exercises does not claim to be exhaustive in covering
the all possible specifications. Our aim has been to identify a number of configura-
tions able to enlighten the predictive ability of the model and its consistency with
empirical evidence. Indeed, the three cases have shown a qualitative and quanti-
tative description of the model dynamics which has been then interpreted within
the framework of the evolutionary theory of economic change. Potentially, other
configurations might be studied as well.
Finally, simulations enable to explore how the behavior of the system depends
on parameters. The sensitivity analysis we conducted indicates that parameters
exert an influence on quantitative results but do not modify the qualitative shapes
of the dynamics and, in particular, the asymptotic trends.
5. Conclusions
This paper has proposed the first systematic attempt to link the evolutionary the-
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particles to firms, it has studied how the process of learning has differentiated effects
over selection. Our modeling structure allows to recover a wide array of market con-
figurations, from monopoly, to oligopoly, to less concentrated ones. In all studied
regimes, we do find a persistent heterogeneous distribution in the knowledge space,
coherently with the evidence.
The essence of the approach relies in the tension between micro-scale interac-
tions and description of macro-scale collective behaviors. Additionally, the specifi-
cation of a hierarchical interactive structure allows to disentangle the role of each
mechanism of the system. Our exercise at this stage was not intended to provide
any normative implication. However, acting on the micro-scale dynamics essentially
means influencing the learning process in its relationship with selection. The latter
is reflected into the market arena, shaping the survival of more or less productive
firms. Clearly, the interplay between micro-scale individual learning and micro-scale
selection defines the evolving aggregate state of industries.
The study of the co-evolution of the two processes is crucial to define the roles
and instruments of industrial policies. In fact, our model entails the possibility to
include higher hierarchical layers influencing the evolution of the landscape. For
example, the role of the State as promoter of national systems of innovation might
be studied. Other model extensions entail the introduction of an imitation factor
among firms and the study of the emergence of agglomerations. By characterizing
the ensuing network structure, one might analyze the resiliency and stability of
alternative configurations.
Finally, let us go back to a topic flagged in Sec. 1, namely the development
of a mathematical theory of complex evolving systems whose quest has informed
the whole paper. The general framework recalls the so-called science of behav-
ioral systems20 or the science of living systems.5 Within that, in this paper, we
address some foundational aspects of the evolutionary theory of economic change
and in particular, the formalization of the coupled dynamics between learning and
selection within the mathematical framework of the kinetic theory of collective
learning.9
The mathematical theory here developed provides a new approach to formalize
by means of the kinetic theory of active particles the interplay between micro-level
entities and the ensuing macro-dynamic, indeed refining upon a multiscale vision
of living systems,7,8 possibly a vindication of the challenge by the sixth Hilbert
problem.19
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